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1. Introduction
A recurrent issue in the private provision of public good is how group
size aﬀects the chance of voluntary provision of public goods. A large
number of experiments have tried to test the Olson (1968) conjecture
that public goods are less likely to be provided in larger groups as ev-
eryone has greater incentive to free ride on others￿ contributions. This
prediction has found game-theoretic ground in Palfrey and Rosenthal
(1986) for the provision of discrete public goods where it is shown that
individual contribution rates fall to zero as group size increases to in-
￿nity (see Proposition 7, p. 182).1 However it is possible that due to
a sheer size eﬀect, aggregate contribution rate may increase in spite of
the decrease in individual contribution rates.2 Taking the special case
of Palfrey and Rosenthal model where only one contributor is neces-
sary to secure provision, Dixit and Skeath (1999) show that individual
contribution rates will decrease suﬃciently to oﬀset the increase in the
size of the group, so that (discrete) public goods are less likely to be
provided in a larger group (see chapter 11, pp. 388-392.). This result
is obtained by assuming that everybody is self-interested. Given the
apparent importance of altruism, the question is then how the presence
of altruism may in￿uence the impact of group size on the provision of
public goods.3 If we identify altruism with the unconditional commit-
ment of contributing,4 the natural expectation would be that altruism
could overturn the result because a larger group has greater chance
of comprising altruistic individuals thereby making the provision of
public good more likely. However we shall see that the chance of any
self-interested individual contributing will decrease suﬃciently to oﬀset
exactly the increase in the chance of having some altruistic individuals
among a larger group. The bottom line is that allowing for altruism
does not increase the voluntary provision of public good. Changes in
the probability of altruism are neutralized in equilibrium by oﬀsetting
1For continuous public goods, a similar limit result has been obtained by Cham-
berlin (1974) when individuals are identical and then extended by Andreoni (1988)
to the case where individuals have diﬀerent endowments.
2Indeed, as shown by Andreoni (1988) for continuous public goods and group
size increasing to in￿nity, individual contribution rate decreases to zero but total
contribution rate increases to a ￿nite value.
3A number of authors have obtained strong evidence of altruism in public good
provision experiments: for recent evidence seeAndreoni and Miller (2001) and for
a survey, see Ledyard (1993).
4This is consistent with the ￿warm glow￿ approach to altruism in which some
agents may derive utility from the sheer fact of giving (see Andreoni, 1988). This
form of altruism may be motivated either by a Kantian principle of unconditional
commitment or by the fact that something is expected in return (see Sugden, 1986).FREE RIDING ON ALTRUISM AND GROUP SIZE 3
changes in sel￿sh voluntary contributions. In contrast to this view,
with continuous public good, altruism increases the level of provision
(see Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1988). Intuitively, when agents care about
the utilities of others, they may contribute beyond the point where their
own marginal bene￿t equals marginal cost.
T h em o d e lw eu s ei sa ne x t e n s i o no fP a l f r e ya n dR o s e n t h a l( 1984)
to accomodate for the possibility of altruism. The model is tractable
enough to allow us to derive sharp results on the eﬀects of altruism and
group size on the equilibrium contribution rate.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyses the
special case where it needs only one to contribute to secure provision.
Section 3 extends the analysis for the case where several contributors
are needed. Section 4 investigates the case of large groups using Poisson
approximation. Section 5 concludes.
2. The model
We use a binary model similar to Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) and
allow for altruism. There is a ￿nite set of individuals N = {1,...,i,...,n}
each with binary pure strategies si of either making a ￿xed contribution
(si =1 )o rn o tc o n t r i b u t i n ga ta l l( si =0 ) to the provision of public
good. This group is a random draw from a large population that com-
prises egoistic agents (in proportion e ∈ (0,1) ) and altruistic agents
in proportion (1−e). The probability that there is no altruistic agents
in a group of size n is en > 0 and the probability that there is at least
one altruistic agent among this group is 1 − en < 1.6 We assume that
for every altruistic player contributing (si =1 ) is a dominant strategy.
The public good is discrete: it is either provided or not. To take the
case were altruism is more likely to facilitate the provision of public
good we assume that it needs only one to contribute to secure the pro-
vision of the public good. (Note that Palfrey and Rosenthal consider
the more general case in which the public good is provided if w out of
n individuals in the group contribute (with 1 ≤ w<n ). We study this
case in the next section.)
5In Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) the focus is rather on comparing how diﬀerent
institutional structures (like the refund and no-refund rules) aﬀect the incentive to
contribute.
6The usual trick for ￿nding the probability that something happens is to calculate
the chance it does not happen. Thus ￿nd the chance that everybody in the group
is an egoistic person, and then substract this from 1 to obtain the probability to
have at least one altruistic person in the group.4 JEAN HINDRIKS AND ROMANS PANCS
Every egoistic player i derives a bene￿t B from the provision of the
public good and pays the cost C if contributing (si =1 ). We assume
that the public good is strongly desirable in the sense that C<B ,s o
that any egoistic player would contribute if he was sure that no one
else is going to contribute. However egoistic agents have an incentive
to free ride getting the payoﬀ B if someone else contributes instead of
the lower payoﬀ B−C in contributing themselves. Given the size of the
group n ≥ 2, what is the equilibrium strategy for the egoistic players?
Every single egoistic player considers that given the group size n ≥ 2
there is at least one altruistic players among the n − 1 other players
with probability 1 − en−1 < 1.H e n c e g i v e n n ≥ 2 (and ignoring risk
aversion), it is a dominant strategy of not contributing (si =0 )f o ra n y
egoistic player if
B − C ≤ (1 − e
n−1)B
where the left hand side is the payoﬀ when contributing
and the right hand side is the expected payoﬀ when not con-
tributing expecting that there is at least one altruistic agent
who will contribute. This condition depends on size of the
group. We must distinguish two cases.
Case 1. high altruism e ≤ C/B
Thus B − C ≤ (1 − e)B and since e<1 it follows that B − C ≤
(1 − en−1)B for all n ≥ 2 and then it is a dominant strategy for any
egoistic agent of not contributing. In other words a suﬃciently high
probability that any single agent be altruistic induces all egoistic agents
to free ride as a dominant strategy. Hence the probability that the
public good be provided in a group of size n ≥ 2 is
Q(n,e)=1− e
n
The chance of public good provision increases with altruism and
group size (diﬀerent from Palfrey and Rosenthal) Summarizing, we
have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If e ≤ C/B, there is a unique equilibrium (in a dom-
inant strategy) in which all the egoistic players free ride. The resulting
probability of providing the public good is increasing with the group size
and with the probability of altruism.FREE RIDING ON ALTRUISM AND GROUP SIZE 5
This ￿nding is consistent with our intuition that altruism should
facilitate the provision of public goods. However we now show that it
needs not be the case if altruism is low.
Case 2. Low altruism: e>C / B
Then B − C>(1 − e)B and since e<1 and C>0 there exists n∗
(with 2 <n ∗ < ∞) such that
B − C>(1 − e
n−1)B for all n<n
∗
B − C ≤ (1 − e




ln(e) > 2. (We ignore integer problems)7
￿ If n ≥ n∗then clearly we have the same result as in proposition
1. The size of the group is large enough to make it suﬃciently
likely that there will be at least one altruistic player in the group
to contribute so that it is a dominant strategy for the egoistic
players to free ride.
￿ If n<n ∗ we have pure strategy equilibria, each with one egois-
tic player contributing and other egoistic players not contribut-
ing. Indeed there cannot be an equilibrium in which two egoistic
players contribute because one contributor is enough and more is
redundant. Also there cannot be an equilibrium in which none
of the egoistic players contributes, because it would be pro￿table
for one of them to contribute since B − C>(1 − en−1)B for all
n<n ∗. In addition to these pure strategy equilibria in which es-
sentially identical egoistic players follow diﬀerent strategies, there
is also a mixed strategy equilibrium where all these players follow
the same strategy. From now on we set aside the (asymmetric)
pure strategy equilibria to focus on the (symmetric) mixed strat-
egy equilibrium. To play a mixed strategy each egoistic player
must be indiﬀerent between the two pure strategies (contribut-
ing and not contributing). Let p be the probability that any one
will not contribute. Contributing gets him B − C for sure. Not
contributing gets him B if someone else contributes and 0 other-
wise. The probability that someone else will contribute among the
n−1 other players is the probability that there is at least one al-
truist among the other players, 1−en−1, plus the probability that
there is no altruist but that at least one egoist will contribute,
7If we are to give the integer equilibrium number then it is 1 <n ∗ < ∞ such
that (1 − e(n∗−1)−1)B<B− C ≤ (1 − en∗−1)B.6 JEAN HINDRIKS AND ROMANS PANCS
en−1(1 − pn−1). Hence any egoistic player is indiﬀerent between
contributing or not when




=( 1 − (ep)
n−1)B









It follows that lower e is exactly oﬀset by higher p to maintain
the product ep constant; that is altruism completely crowds out
egoistic contributions. It is also easily seen that p is increasing
with the size of the group n. We can summarize this ￿nding in
the following proposition.
Proposition 2. For all n<n ∗, the larger the group the less likely is
anyone to contribute. Furthermore, the larger the probability of altru-
ism, the less likely anyone of the egoists will contribute.
Using the equilibrium mixed strategy we can easily calculate the
chance of providing the public good as a function of altruism and the
size of the group. Since it needs only one to contribute to secure pro-
vision of the public good, the chance of providing the public good is
obtained by ￿nding the chance that the public good is not provided
(which implies that everyone is egoistic and none of them contribute)
and then substracting this from 1. So the probability of providing the












Surprisingly, altruism does not aﬀect the chance of providing the
public good provided that the size of the group is not too high; for
otherwise the probability to have at least one altruistic person in the
group is so high that it is impossible to sustain the mixed strategy
equilibrium and it is a dominant strategy for every egoist to free ride.
The corresponding chance of providing the public good is thenFREE RIDING ON ALTRUISM AND GROUP SIZE 7
Q(e,n)=1− e
n for all n ≥ n
∗
To summarize our ￿nding.
Proposition 3. If e>C / Bthere exists a critical group size n∗ =
1+
ln(C/B)
ln(e) > 2 such that
(i) for any n<n ∗ the chance of providing the public good is inde-
pendent of altruism and decreasing with the size of the group
(ii) for any n ≥ n∗the chance of providing the public good is increas-
ing both with altruism and with the group size.
So on the eﬀect of altruism, the conjecture that altruism facilitates
the provision of public goods is not correct when the group is small. The
reason is that for a small group, the chance of having some altruistic
players is suﬃciently small to keep egoistic players contributing (at least
with some probability). However, the chance of anyone egoistic player
contributing decreases suﬃciently to oﬀset the increase in the chance
of having at least one altruist. Similarly on the eﬀect of group size,
although it is more likely to have at least one altruist among a larger
g r o u p ,t h ec h a n c eo fa n y o n ee g o i s tc o n t r i b u t i n gd e c r e a s e ss u ﬃciently to
overcome this eﬀect. As the group size increases the free rider problem
is more important. Only if the size of the group is suﬃciently high to
eliminate any incentive for the egoists to contribute, then the intuition
is restored; that is altruism and larger group facilitate the provision of
public goods.
3. Several contributors needed
We extend the analysis by allowing for the possibility that it needs
more than one person to contribute to secure public good provision.
When the provision of the public good requires several volunteers (in-
stead of one) then the decision of contributing no longer guarantees
the provision of the public good. Contributing is powerless if there are
too few contributors and redundant when there are too many contribu-
tors. What matters is the probability of making a pivotal contribution
(when there is just one contributor missing). Let w ≥ 1 be the number
of contributors required to provide the public good and let mn denote
the actual number of contributors in a group of size n, then for any
1 ≤ w ≤ n the probability that there are exactly w − 1 contributors
in a group of size n − 1 is8 JEAN HINDRIKS AND ROMANS PANCS






n−w (1 − ep)
w−1
where ep ∈ (0,1) is the probability that anyone drawn randomly from
the population will not contribute given the frequency e of egoists and
their equilibrium probability p of not contributing.
Assuming no-refund if public good is not provided, the indiﬀerence
condition between contributing and not contributing is
prob{mn−1 ≥ w − 1}B − C = prob{mn−1 ≥ w}B
or
prob{mn−1 = w − 1}B = C
where the probability of making a pivotal contribution is the prob-
ability of obtaining exactly w − 1 contributors among the n − 1 other
players. Using the expression of the probability of being pivotal, the










Therefore a higher frequency of altruism (lower e) will increase the
equilibrium probability p of not contributing of any egoist so as to
maintain ep ￿xed. It follows that the probability of any randomly
chosen individual not contributing is independent of the frequency of
altruism.
Using this mixed strategy equilibrum we can calculate the probability
that the public good is not provided in a group of size n when w,(1 ≤















n−s (1 − ep)
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Thus under the mixed strategy equilibrium, altruism does not aﬀect
the chance of providing the public good. This is because actual public
good provision depends only on the probability that any randomly
drawn individual will contribute, 1 − ep, which as previously shown is
independent of the frequency of altruism.
Proposition 4. If w ≥ 1 contributors are necessary to provide the
public good in a group of size n (with w ≤ n), under a mixed strategy
equilibrium the chance of providing the public good is independent of
altruism.
We now turn to the eﬀect of group size when several contributors are
needed. We begin with the extreme case of unanimous contribution
to illustrate the diﬀerence in the sharpest way and we maintain our
assumption of no-refund.8 Suppose that participation of all is required,





and the probability of no provision is
P
not








Comparing this unanimous contribution problem to the single con-
tribution problem in section 2 we have the following proposition.
Proposition 5. I nas y m m e t r i cm i x e ds t r a t e g ye q u i l i b r i u ma n dn or e -
fund rule, the probability of no provision when unanimous participation
is required is exactly equal to the probability of provision when the par-
ticipation of only one agent is required. Furthermore, with unanimous
participation, the probability of provision increases as the size of the
group increases.
8With no refund and unanimous contribution, the incentive to free ride on others￿
contributions is replaced by the fear of wasting contribution if the public good is
not provided. This fear may refrain agents from contributing (see Palfrey and
Rosenthal, 1984, p.185).10 JEAN HINDRIKS AND ROMANS PANCS
This proposition sharply illustrates that participation of all is more
likely in a larger group while from proposition 3 participation of only
one is less likely. Thus the Olson conjecture (that the free rider problem
is more important in larger group) is correct when the initiative of
just one person is needed to secure provision but not when unanimous
participation is necessary.
The next proposition is about the eﬀect of group size for the in-
termediate case where the participation of several but not everyone is
required (1 <w<n ).
Proposition 6. In a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium with no re-
fund rule, for any 1 <w<n , (i) the probability of anyone contributing
is decreasing with the size of the group, but (ii) the eﬀect of group size




In this section we assume that the group is large and we derive an
approximation result on the eﬀect of the group size upon the individual
probability of contributing and the chance of providing the public good.
Let r =1− ep be the mixed strategy equilibrium probability of
contributing, From Proposition 6 we know that this probability is de-
creasing in n. So when the value of n is large the value of r is small
and the binomial distribution with parameters n and r can be approx-
imated by a Poisson distribution with mean λ = nr (representing the
expected number of contributors in a group of size n).9 Now consider a
larger group n1 >n ,a n dl e tr1 be the corresponding equilibrium prob-
ability of contributing. Then by the indiﬀerence condition the mixed
strategy equilibrium solves10
9How good is this approximation? Following Yamane (1969), the rule of thumb
is that for most cases, when nr ≤ 5, we can use the Poisson distribution as an
approximation of the binomial distribution. As an example, r ≤ 0.20 requires
n>10.
10Note the binomial property that the probability of having any exact number
of contributors tends to zero as the size of the group increases to in￿nity. So the
cost to bene￿t ratio (C/B)m u s tb es u ﬃciently small to sustain mixed strategy
equilibrium in large groups.FREE RIDING ON ALTRUISM AND GROUP SIZE 11
prob{mn−1 = w − 1} = prob{mn1−1 = w − 1} =
C
B







Letting λn−1 =( n − 1)r and λn1−1 =( n1 − 1)r1 it follows from this
equation that λn−1 = λn1−1 and thus r1 = n−1
n1−1r<rfor n<n 1.
That is for large n i ncreasing the group size decreases the equilibrium
probability of contributing. Furthermore, limn→∞r = limn→∞
λn−1
n−1 =0
since λn−1 = λn1−1for any n 6= n1.I f w e l e t λ = nr and λ1 = n1r1,
then it follows from (n − 1)r =( n1 − 1)r1 that λ1 = λ− (r − r1) < λ .
That is the expected number of contributors decreases with the group
size.11Therefore, the number of contributors can be approximated by a
Poisson distribution for which the mean is lower λ1 < λ in the larger
group n1 >n .L e t f(x | λ) and f(x | λ1) denote the Poisson distri-
bution (of the number of contributors x) for which the mean is respec-
tively λ and λ1. Then applying a theorem on Poisson distributions12
(see Schmetterer, 1974, Theorem 33.2, p.92) we get that for any integer












Therefore the probability of no provision is increasing with group
size.
The next proposition summarizes our ￿nding about large groups.
11Furthermore, limn→∞ λ = limn→∞(n − 1)r + r = λn−1. That is the expected
number of contributors converges to a ￿nite value.
12The Theorem states that given the Poisson distribution f(x | λ) with mean
0 ≤ λ < ∞,f o re a c h0 ≤ k<∞ the function Sk(λ)=
Pk
x=0 f(x | λ) is strictly
monotone decreasing in λ.12 JEAN HINDRIKS AND ROMANS PANCS
Proposition 7. For large n, in a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium
with no refund rule we have that for each integer 1 <w<n :
(i) the probability of anyone contributing decreases with n;
(ii) the probability of anyone contributing tends to zero as n increases
to in￿nity;
(iii) the expected number of contributors decreases with n;
(iv) the probability of provision is decreasing with n.
5. Conclusion
We have shown that aggregate contribution to public goods is inde-
pendent of altruism. The reason is that altruistic contributions crowd
out sel￿sh contributions dollar-for-dollar. This neutrality result has
been obtained for the voluntary provision of discrete public goods iden-
tifying altruism as a unconditional commitment of contributing. The
invariance to altruism stands in sharp contrast with continuous public
goods where altruism tends to increase provision. We have also exam-
ined the eﬀect of group size on the equilibrium contribution rates and
provision level. The Olson conjecture that larger groups encourage free
riding and lead to lower supply has been con￿rmed. The interpretation
is that individual contributions will fall more rapidly than the increase
in the number of potential contributors. Lastly, we have shown that
the average number of contributors is decreasing with the size of the
group.
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6. Appendix: Proof of Proposition 6
6.1. impact of size on mixed strategy equilibrium. Let q = ep
denote the equilibrium probability that any randomly drawn agent will
not contribute in a group of size n and let q1 = ep1 be the corresponding




























1 (1 − q1)
w−1
De￿ne the function f :( 0 ,1) → (0,1) where f(x)=xa(1 −x)b,w i t h
a,b > 0 and f0(x) ≥ (<)0 for a(1−x) ≥ (<)bx.D e ￿ne also φ =
nq1
n−(w−1)
where φ ≥ 1 for (1−q1)n ≤ w−1. Using this notation we can rewrite
the above equation as follows
f(q)=φf(q1)
where f(q)=f(q1) for q = q1,a n df(q1) is increasing for w − 1 <
(1 − q1)(n − 1), and decreasing otherwise. Thus,
￿ either φ ≥ 1 (that is, (1 − q1)n ≤ w − 1) which implies14 JEAN HINDRIKS AND ROMANS PANCS
f(q) ≥ f(q1)= ⇒ q ≤ q1 since (1 − q1)(n − 1) < (1 − q1)n ≤ w − 1
￿ or φ < 1 (that is, (1 − q1)n>w− 1) which implies
f(q) <f(q1) ⇒ q>q 1 for (1 − q1)(n − 1) <w− 1 < (1 − q1)n
q<q 1 for w − 1 < (1 − q1)(n − 1)
So we have the result that increasing the group size from n to n +1
increases the probability of anyone not contributing (q<q 1 ⇔ p(n) <
p(n+1)) except for the very special case where this size increase makes
the expected number of contributors switch from less to more than
w − 1. This proves part (i) of proposition 6.
6.2. Impact of size on provision. We need to show that for any
integer 1 <w<n , increasing group size has an ambiguous eﬀect on
the probability of provision. That is,
P
not
w (e,n) ≷ P
not
w (e,n +1 )

















n−s+1 (1 − q1)
s
From the ￿rst part of the Appendix q<q 1, then applying an inequal-


















n−s (1 − q1)
s
But for the same (positive) probability of anyone contributing 1 −
q1 ∈ (0,1), it is also less likely to have less than w contributors in a

















n−s (1 − q1)
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So we have two opposite eﬀects of group size on the probability of
provision and (due to the non-diﬀerentiability of the binomial coeﬃ-
cient) it is not possible to say which eﬀect dominates in general. This
completes the proof.This working paper has been produced by
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